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Abstract
Efficient modeling on uncertain information plays an important role in estimat-
ing the risk of contaminant intrusion in water distribution networks. Dempster-
Shafer evidence theory is one of the most commonly used methods. However,
the Dempster-Shafer evidence theory has some hypotheses including the exclu-
sive property of the elements in the frame of discernment, which may not be
consistent with the real world. In this paper, based on a more effective represen-
tation of uncertainty, called D numbers, a new method that allows the elements
in the frame of discernment to be non-exclusive is proposed. To demonstrate
the efficiency of the proposed method, we apply it to the water distribution
networks to estimate the risk of contaminant intrusion.
Keywords: contaminant intrusion, water distribution networks,
Dempster-Shafer evidence theory, D numbets, fuzzy numbers, belief function
1. Introduction
Water supply systems are one of the most important fundamentals for hu-
man living and development[1, 2, 3]. The topic relating to the performance of
the water supply systems under varied conditions has been paid considerable
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attention [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Water supply systems are usually designed, constructed,5
operated, and managed in an open environment. As a result, they are inevitably
exposed to varied uncertain threats and hazards [9, 10, 11, 12]. Contaminant
intrusion in a water distribution network is a complex phenomenon, which de-
pends on three elements - a pathway, a driving force and a contamination source
[13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. However, the data on these elements are generally incom-10
plete, non-specific and uncertain [18].
Quantitative aggregation of incomplete, uncertain and imprecise information
data warrants the use of soft computing methods [19, 20, 21]. Soft computing
methods such as fuzzy set theory [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27], rough set [28, 29],
Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [30, 31, 32] can essentially provide rational so-15
lutions for complex real-world problems. The traditional Bayesian (subjectivist)
probability approach cannot differentiate between aleatory and epistemic uncer-
tainties and is unable to handle non-specific, ambiguous and conflicting infor-
mation without making strong assumptions. These limitations can be addressed
by the application of Dempster-Shafer evidence theory, which was found to be20
flexible enough to combine the rigor of probability theory with the flexibility of
rule-based systems [20, 33, 34].
Due to the requirements of safety and reliability of the water supply sys-
tem, risk assessment has been recognised as a useful tool to identify threats,
analyse vulnerabilities and risks, and select mitigation measures for water sup-25
ply systems [35, 36]. Accordingly, an object-oriented approach for water supply
systems is proposed in [35], which is based on aggregative risk assessment (sim-
ilar to [37]) and fuzzy fault tree analysis and use fuzzy evidential reasoning
method to determine the risk levels associated with components, subsystems,
and the overall water supply system. Then evidential reasoning model based30
on Dempster-Shafer evidence theory is applied to estimate risk of contaminant
intrusion in water distribution network [20, 38].
However, there are some shortcomings in previous methods. In the classical
Dempster-Shafer evidence theory, a problem domain is indicated by the con-
cept of frame of discernment, and the concept of basic probability assignment35
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(BPA) is used to represent the uncertain information. But there are several
hard hypotheses and constraints. For example, the elements in the frame of dis-
cernment must be mutually exclusive and the sum of BPA must be equal to 1,
which is usually inconsistent with the applications above. These shortcomings
have greatly limited its practical application [33, 39].40
Recently, a new methodology called D numbers [33, 39, 40, 41] to represent
uncertain information has been proposed, which is an extension of Dempster-
Shafer evidence theory. D numbers can effectively represent uncertain informa-
tion. The exclusive property of the elements in the frame of discernment is not
required, and the completeness constraint is released. Due to the propositions45
of applications in the real word could not be strictly mutually exclusive, these
two improvements are greatly beneficial. To get a more accurate uncertain data
fusion, a discounting of D numbers based on the exclusive degree is necessary. In
this paper, a new exclusive model based on D numbers to combine the uncertain
data at a non-exclusive level was proposed.50
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, some definitions of
D numbers is introduced. A step-by-step applications of the proposed model
to a numerical example are illustrated in Section 3. In Section 4, the proposal
exclusive model based on D numbers was applied to the water distribution
networks to assess the risk of contaminant intrusion. Conclusions are given in55
Section 5.
2. D numbers
Situations in the real world are affected by many sources of uncertainty.
Many existing theories have been developed to model various types of uncer-
tainty with some desirable properties. However, these theories still contain defi-60
ciencies that can not be ignored. For example, due to the inherent advantages in
the representation and handling of uncertain information, the Dempster-Shafer
evidence theory is being studied for use in many fields. Such as decision making,
pattern recognition[42], risk assessment [20, 43], supplier selection and others.
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In the mathematical framework of Dempster-Shafer theory, the basic probabil-65
ity assignment (BPA) defined on the frame of discernment is used to express the
uncertainty quantitatively. A problem domain indicated by a finite and mutu-
ally exclusive non-empty set Ω is called a frame of discernment. Let 2Ω denote
the power set of Ω. The elements in the 2Ω are called propositions. The BPA is
a mapping m from 2Ω to [0, 1], and satisfying the following condition [30, 31]:70
m(φ) = 0 and
∑
A∈2Ω
m(A) = 1 (1)
BPA has an advantage of directly expressing the ‘uncertainty’ by assign-
ing the basic probability to the subsets of the set composed of N individual
objects, rather than to each of the individual objects. But there exists some
strong hypotheses and hard constraints on the frame of discernment and BPA,
which limit the practical application of Dempster-Shafer evidence theory. One75
of the hypotheses is that the elements in the frame of discernment are required
to be mutually exclusive. However, this hypothesis is difficult to be satisfied
in many situations. For example, the linguistic assessments shown in Fig. 1
can be "Low", "Fairly low", "Medium", "Fairly high", "High". Due to these
assessments is based on human judgment, they inevitably contain intersections.80
The exclusiveness between these propositions can’t be guaranteed precisely, so
that the application of Dempster-Shafer evidence theory is questionable and
limited in this situation. That means, it is not correct to give a BPA like this:
m(Fairly high,High) = 0.8, m(High) = 0.2.
D numbers[39] is a new representation of uncertain information, which is85
an extension of Dempster-Shafer evidence theory. It overcomes the existing
deficiencies in Dempster-Shafer evidence theory and appears to be more effective
in representing various types of uncertainty. D numbers are defined as follows.
Let Ω be a finite nonempty set, a D number is a mapping formulated by
D : Ω→ [0, 1] (2)
with90 ∑
B⊆Ω
D(B) ≤ 1 and D(φ) = 0 (3)
4
Figure 1: Five-granular set of linguistic constants.
It seems that the definition of D numbers is similar to the definition of BPA.
But note that, the first difference is the concept of the frame of discernment
in Dempster-Shafer evidence theory. The elements in the frame of discernment
Ω of D numbers do not require mutually exclusive. Second, the completeness
constraint is released in D numbers. If
∑
B⊆ΩD(B) = 1, the information is said95
to be complete; if
∑
B⊆ΩD(B) ≤ 1, the information is said to be incomplete.
An illustrative example is given to show the D numbers as below.
Example 1. Suppose a project is assessed, the assessment score is repre-
sented by an interval [0, 100]. In the frame of Dempster-Shafer evidence theory,
an expert could give a BPA to express his assessment result:
m({a1}) = 0.2
m({a3}) = 0.7
m({a1, a2, a3}) = 0.1
where a1 = [0, 40], a2 = [41, 70], a3 = [71, 100]. The set of {a1, a2, a3} is a frame
of discernment in Dempster-Shafer evidence theory.
However, if another expert gives his assessment result by using D numbers,
it could be:
D({b1}) = 0.2
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D({b3}) = 0.6
D({b1, b2, b3}) = 0.1
where b1 = [0, 45], b2 = [38, 73], b3 = [61, 100]. Note that the probability100
assignment of the set of {b1, b2, b3} is not a BPA, because the elements in
the set {b1, b2, b3} are not mutually exclusive. Due to D({b1}) + D({b3}) +
D({b1, b2, b3}) = 0.9, the information is incomplete. This example has shown
the differences between BPA and D numbers.
If a problem domain is Ω = {b1, b2, ..., bi, ..., bn}, where bi ∈ R and bi 6= bj if
i 6= j, a special form of D numbers can be expressed by:
D({b1}) = v1
D({b2}) = v2
...
D({bi}) = vi
...
D({bn}) = vn
or simply denoted as D = {(b1, v1), (b2, v2), ..., (bi, vi), ..., (bn, vn)}, where vi > 0105
and
∑n
i=1 vi ≤ 1. Some properties of D numbers are introduced as follows.
Relative matrix. n linguistic constants expressed in normal triangular
fuzzy numbers are illustrated in Fig. 2. The area of intersection Sij and union
Uij between any two triangular fuzzy numbers Li and Lj can be can calculated
to represent the non-exclusive degree between two D numbers. For example,110
the intersection S12 and the union U12 in Fig. 2. The non-exclusive degree Dij
can be calculated as follows:
Dij =
Sij
Uij
(4)
It should be emphasized that how to determine the non-exclusive degree
depends on the application type. Due to the characteristic of the fuzzy numbers,
we choose the area of intersection and union between two fuzzy numbers. A115
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Figure 2: Four linguistic constants.
relative Matrix for these elements based on the non-exclusive degree can be
build as below:
R =


L1 L2 . . . Li . . . Ln
L1 1 D12 . . . D1i . . . D1n
L2 D21 1 . . . D2i . . . D2n
...
...
... . . .
... . . .
...
Li Di1 Di2 . . . 1 . . . Din
...
...
... . . .
... . . .
...
Ln Dn1 Dn2 . . . Dni . . . 1


(5)
Exclusive coefficient. The exclusive coefficient ε is used to characterize
the exclusive degree of the propositions in a assessment situation, which is got by
calculating the average non-exclusive degree of these elements using the upper120
triangular of the relative matrix. Namely:
ε =
∑n
i,j=1,i6=j Dij
n(n− 1)/2
(6)
where n is the number of the propositions in the assessment situation. Smaller
the ε is, the more exclusive the propositions of the application are. When ε = 0,
the propositions of application are completely mutually exclusive. That is, this
situation is up to the requirements of the Dempster-Shafer evidence theory.125
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The combination rule of D numbers. Firstly, the given D numbers
should be discounted by the exclusive coefficient ε, which can guarantee the
elements in the frame of discernment Ω to be exclusive. The D numbers can be
discounted as below:
D(Ai)ε = D(Ai).(1− ε)
130
D(Θ)ε = D(Θ).(1 − ε) + ε (7)
where Ai is the elements in Ω.
Then the combination rule of D numbers based on the exclusive coefficient
is illustrated as follows.
D(A)ε =
∑
B∩C=AD1(B)εD2(C)ε
1− k
(8)
with
k =
∑
B∩C=φ
D1(B)εD2(C)ε (9)
where k is a normalization constant, called conflict because it measures the135
degree of conflict between D1 and D2.
One should note that, if ε = 0, i.e, the elements in the frame of discernment
Ω are completely mutually exclusive, the D numbers will not be discount by the
exclusive coefficient. That is, the mutually exclusive situation of D numbers is
completely the same with the Dempster-Shafer evidence theory.140
3. Proposed model based on D numbers
In this section, the proposed model based on D number will be illustrated
with a numerical example. In the model, the exclusive coefficient is proposed to
represent the exclusive degree among the propositions in the frame of the dis-
cernment. From section 2, we know that, one of the advantages of D numbers is145
that the elements in the frame of the discernment Ω are not required to be mu-
tually exclusive. It’s clear that propositions of application in real world can’t be
completely mutually exclusive, so define the exclusive coefficient to undermine
8
the non-exclusive property is essential. For example, linguistic assessment based
on human judgment can be "fairly good", "good" and "very good", which is150
obviously non-exclusive but need to be assessed. A numerical example to show
the proposed method is illustrated through a step-by-step description.
Step 1 Constructing the linguistic constants [43] expressed in positive trape-
zoidal fuzzy numbers. The details of linguistic constants presented in Fig. 1 are
shown in Table 1.155
Table 1: Linguistic constants represented by trapezoidal fuzzy numbers
Variable linguistic constants Fuzzy numbers
Low (0.04,0.1,0.18,0.23)
Fairly low (0.17,0.22,0.36,0.42)
Medium (0.32,0.41,0.58,0.65)
Fairly high (0.58,0.63,0.80,0.86)
High (0.72,0.78,0.92,0.97)
Step 2 Calculate the area of intersection Si,j and the union Ui,j between
any two trapezoidal fuzzy numbers Di and Dj respectively. For example,
S12, S23, S34 and S45 in the Fig. 1 is some intersections.
Step 3 Calculate the non-exclusive degree Dij between two fuzzy numbers
according to Eq. 4. For example, the non-exclusive degree between "low" and
"fairly low" can be calculated as follows:
D12 =
0.018
0.312
= 0.0577
Step 4 Build a relative Matrix following the regulation defined in Section
9
2. The relative Matrix of current example is:160
R =


low fairly low medium firly high high
low 1 0.0577 0 0 0
fairly low 0.0577 1 0.081 0 0
medium 0 0.081 1 0.0449 0
firly high 0 0 0.0449 1 0.2353
high 0 0 0 0.2353 1


(10)
Step 5 Calculate the exclusive coefficient ε through Eq. 6. That is:
ε =
0.0577 + 0.081 + 0.0449 + 0.2353
10
= 0.042
Step 6 Discounting the D numbers according to Eq. 7. Two D number D1
and D2 based on the fuzzy numbers in Table 1 are shown in Table 2. Then we
can discount these two D numbers using the exclusive coefficient ε, the results
D(Ai)ε are also in Table 2.
Table 2: The initial and discounted D numbers
Ai D1(Ai) D2(Ai) D1(Ai)ε D2(Ai)ε
({low}) 0.12 0.1 0.115 0.096
({low}, {fairly low) 0.7 0.06 0.671 0.057
({medium}) 0.02 0.6 0.019 0.575
({high}, {medium}) 0.1 0.2 0.096 0.192
({fairly high}) 0.06 0.04 0.057 0.38
{Θ} 0 0 0.042 0.042
Step 7 Use the combination rule of D numbers given in Section 2 to get the
final assessment. Namely:
D({low}) = 0.3096
D({low}, {fairly low}) = 0.2359
D({medium}) = 0.3232
10
D({fairly high}) = 0.0213
D({high}, {medium}) = 0.1039
D({Θ}) = 0.0061
4. Estimating risk of contaminant intrusion165
Contaminant intrusion in a water distribution network is a complex phe-
nomenon, which depends on three elements C a pathway, a driving force and a
contamination source [13, 14]. However, the data on these elements are generally
incomplete, non-specific and uncertain. In earlier studies, evidential reasoning
model has been used to estimate risk of contaminant intrusion in water distri-170
bution network based on above three elements [20, 38]. This section provides
another methods called D numbers to assess the risk of contaminant intrusion
in distribution networks.
In previous work [20, 38], the problem domain of risk of an intrusion can
be described by a universal set Θ = {P,NP}, in which ‘P’ denotes ‘possible’175
and ‘NP’ denotes ‘not possible’ intrude. The power set of the risk of intrusion
consists of two singletons {P} and, {NP}, a universal set {P,NP} and the
empty set {φ}. As described earlier, the risk of contaminant intrusion can be
evaluated based on three elements ĺC a pathway (e1), a driving force (e2), and
a contamination source (e3).180
We select surrogate measures to simplify the intrusion problem. The break-
age rate (# of breaks/100 km/year) is taken as a surrogate measure for an
"intrusion pathway", transient pressure(psi) is taken as a surrogate for a "driv-
ing force", and the separation distance (meters) between a contaminant source
and a water main as a surrogate measure for the "source of contamination". The185
frame of discernment Ω are mapped to obtain D numbers(i.e., D1, D2, andD3),
where each of them can be assigned to these subsets P, P, NP, and NP.
For this problem, we propose a new contaminant intrusion model based on D
numbers, which make use of the exclusive coefficient to represent the exclusive
11
Figure 3: Three evidence bodies: pathway, driving force and contamination source.
degree among the propositions of the water distribute networks. A step-by-step190
description is provided below:
Step 1 Construct the description of propositions and collect data. For exam-
ple, in Fig. 3, the description of each proposition is represented as trapezoidal
fuzzy numbers. The collected data are real numbers. It should be emphasized
here that triangular fuzzy numbers and real numbers are the special cases of195
generalized trapezoidal fuzzy numbers. This step is the same as in case of [20].
Step 2 Identify D numbers of these three evidence bodies respectively. We
first choose a scenario from Fig. 3, in which the following bodies of evidence
are observed:
(1) Pipe breakage rate is ‘10 breaks/100 km/year’ (Fig. 3(a)).
D1(P ) = 0 D1(P,NP ) = 0 D1(NP ) = 1
(2) The possibility of pressure drop to ‘0 psi’ at the respective node (Fig. 3(b)).
D2(P ) = 0 D2(P,NP ) = 1 D2(NP ) = 0, and
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(3) A leaky sewer is located at a distance of ‘3’ m (Fig. 3(c)).
D3(P ) = 1 D3(P,NP ) = 0 D3(NP ) = 0.
Step 3 Following steps in section 3 to calculate the exclusive coefficient of
these evidence bodies respectively. Results are shown as follows.
ε1 = 0.1195, ε2 = 0.1057, ε1 = 0.131
Step 4 Discount D numbers above according to Eq. 7. Table 3 also shows200
the discounted BPA.
Table 3: Assessment of the risk of contaminant intrusion.
Evidence value ε Di({P})ε Di({P,NP})ε Di({NP})ε
Pathway,e1 10 0.1195 0 0.869 0.131
(# bks/100 km/year)
Pressure, e2(psi) 0 0.1057 0 0 1
Contaminant source, 3 0.131 0.869 0 0.131
e3(m)
Step 5 Use the combination rule of D numbers (Eq. 8) to obtain integrated
D numbers of risk of contaminant intrusion at a given location in a distribu-
tion network. For example, the integrated D numbers of this scenario for risk
assessment is:
D({P}) = 0.44, D({NP}) = 0.49, D({P,NP}) = 0.07
To illustrate the efficiency of the proposed method, we choose five additional
scenarios as [20] do. The results obtained through both methods are illustrated
in Table 4. The proposed model make the assessment based on D numbers
discounted by the exclusive coefficient, which reflects the exclusive degree of205
these propositions. While the method in [20] use the Dempster-Shafer evidence
theory based on the mutually exclusive hypothesis between the propositions,
which is impractical in the real-word applications. From the results, we can see
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Table 4: Some hypothetical scenarios to demonstrate the comparison of two meth-
ods.
Scenario e1 e2 e3 Method Risk
({P}, {P,NP}, {NP})
1 10 0 3 Sadiq et al. (2006) (0.31, 0.21, 0.48)
Proposed (0.44, 0.07, 0.49)
2 10 0 20 Sadiq et al. (2006) (0, 0.3, 0.7)
Proposed (0, 0.1195, 0.8805)
3 10 50 20 Sadiq et al. (2006) (0, 0.03, 0.97)
Proposed (0, 0.013, 0.987)
4 30 50 20 Sadiq et al. (2006) (0, 0.1, 0.9)
Proposed (0,0.11,0.89)
5 30 50 3 Sadiq et al. (2006) (0.13, 0.09, 0.78)
Proposed (0.41,0.06,0.53)
6 30 -20 3 S (0.96, 0.04, 0)
Proposed (0.98,0.02,0)
e1: Breaks (# bks/100 km/year)
e2: Pressure (psi)
e3: Separation distance (m)
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that, the incompleteness of the result on the bias of exclusive coefficient is much
smaller than that of [20]. The proposed method not only allow the propositions210
of application to be non-exclusive, but also give a more effective assessment.
5. Conclusion
One of the assumptions to apply the Dempster-Shafer evidence evidence
theory is that all the elements in the frame of discernment should be mutually
exclusive. However, it is difficult to meet the requirement in the real-world215
applications. In this paper, a new mathematic tool to model uncertain informa-
tion, called as D numbers, is used to model and combine the domain experts’
opinions under the condition that the linguistic constants are not exclusive with
each other. An exclusive coefficient is proposed to discount the D numbers. Af-
ter the discounted D numbers are obtained, the domain experts’ opinion can be220
fused based on our proposed combination rule of D numbers. The application
to estimate the risk of the contamination intrusion of the water distribution
network illustrates the efficiency of our proposed D numbers method.
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